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FIGHTING THE TOFU: LAW AND POLITICS IN
SCHOLARSHIP AND ADJUDICATION
Stephen M. Feldman*
ABSTRACT

Law professors and political scientists often aim to deny, control,
or otherwise tame the dynamic interactions of law and politics that are
integral to adjudication. The University of Chicago Ihw Review recently published an issue containing two such articles: Charles L Barzun's
Impeaching Precedent and Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule's Inside or
Outside the System. Both articles sought to police the boundary between
law and politics, between the internal and external The two articles,
however, struggled to reach that shared goal in strikingly different and
ultimately irreconcilable ways, both of which were unavailing. And that
is my point: the law-politics dynamic in judicial decision making cannot
be tamed regardless of how a scholar attacks it. In the future, scholars
should devote more energy to exploring rather than subduing the lawpolitics dynamic.
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INTRODUCTION

Law and politics dynamically intemct in judicial decision making.
Yet much legal as well as political science scholarship tries to deny, control, or otherwise tame the law-politics dynamic. The dynamic, though,
Jerry W. Housel/Carl F. Arnold Distinguished Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of
Political Science, University of Wyoming. I thank Charles Barzun, Richard Delgado, Ken I
Kersch, and Mark Tushnet for their comments on earlier drafts.
*
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cannot be subdued. Scholars, therefore, should devote more time and
energy to exploring rather than taming the relations between law and
politics in adjudication
To explain and illustrate this thesis, I focus on two provocative articles recently published in a single issue of the University of Chicago
Law Review.' Being one of the most prestigious legal journals, the Chicago Law Review often publishes interesting pieces, yet the juxtaposition of these two articles was extraordinary. They contradicted each
other.2
In Impeaching Precedent, Charles L Barzun argued that a litigant
should be allowed to introduce evidence that would impeach or discredit judicial precedent. Impeaching evidence would show that the
court, which had decided the precedent, had relied on improper or "extralegal" factors.3 In Inside or Outside the System?, Eric A. Posner and
Adrian Vermeule asserted that many law review articles are internally
inconsistent. For example, Posner and Vermeule observed that numerous authors adopt an external view, such as a political science perspective, when criticizing a Supreme Court decision. Those same authors,
though, switch to an internal view of the judicial process when recommending an alternative to the Court's decision. Posner and Vermeule
issued a call for consistency. If an author begins with an external perspective, then the author should maintain that perspective throughout
his or her article.
The conflict between Barzun's Impeaching Precedent and Posner and
Vermeule's Inside or Outside was not obvious. To the contrary, at first
glance, the articles appeared complementary. Both pieces concerned the
nature of adjudication and scholarship analyzing adjudication. Both
pieces distinguished between internal and external views of adjudication, and in so doing, both relied on the inveterate distinction between
law and politics. A judge embedded within judicial and legal practicesthat is, adhering to the internal view-supposedly applies the law and
disregards politics when deciding a case. But a political scientist analyzing that judicial decision might instead follow an external view, focusing

&

I Charles L. Barzun, Impeabing Precedent, 80 U. Cii. L. REV. 1625 (2013); Eric A. Posner
Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside t/u Sysm2 80 U. Cii. L. REv. 1743(2013).
2 Law journals occasionally publish symposium issues that contain conflicting pieces. But a
symposium invites multiple authors to present divergent views about the same topic.
3 Barzun, supra note 1, at 1630.
4 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1754-56.
s Id. at 1796.
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on politics while disregarding the law.'
Given the overlap of the articles, the Law Review editors might
have been unaware of the conflict.7 If so, the editors probably became
uncomfortable when Barzun subsequently submitted an essay cnticizing the Posner and Vermeule article.' Barzun articulated multiple criticisms of Inside or Outide, but he eventually reached the crux of the matter. Posner and Vermeule's thesis threatened the coherence of Barzun's
argument.' Ultimately, Posner and Vermeule's Inside or Outide contradicted Barzun's Impeaching Precedent, and Barzun sought to defend his
position.10
I revisit the conflict but for different purposes. I have no interest
in taking sides, in choosing between Barzun, on the one side, or Posner
and Vermeule, on the other. Instead, I am interested in what the disagreement reveals about adjudication and legal scholarship in genemL
Specifically, the tension between Barzun's Impeaching Precedent and Posner and Vermeule's Inside or Outside suggests that scholarship analyzing
adjudication often amounts to fightingthe tofu."
Some problems or issues are like tofu. One can wrestle with them,
pushing and pulling this way and that, but the fight is futile. Despite
struggling desperately to control the tofu, "you get nowhere."1 2 A large
segment of scholarship about judicial decision making seeks to tame the
dynamic interactions of law and politics. Barzun's Impeaching Precedent
and Posner and Vermeule's Inside or Outside fall into that category. Both
articles sought to police the boundary between law and politics, between the internal and external. The two articles, though, struggled to
reach that goal in strikingly different (and inconsistent) ways, both of
which were unavailing. And that is my point: the law-politics dynamic

6 For discussions of the relation between law and politics, see Stephen M. Feldman, Su-

preme CourtAlckmy Turning Law and Polits into Mayonnaise, 12 GEo.J. L. & PUB. Poit'Y 57 (2014)
[hereinafter Feldman, Alchemy]; Stephen M. Feldman, T& Rule of Law or tA Rule qcPolitics? Harmonizing the Internaland External Views of Supreme Court DecisionMaking, 30 L. & Soc. INQuIRY 89
(2005) [hereinafter Feldman, Harmonizing]; Keith E. Whittington, Owe More unto the Brea/x
PostBehadoraistApproacfrsto judicial Poliths, 25 L. &Soc. INQUIRY 601 (2000).
7 Of course, I am conjecturing about the editors' (collective) state of mind. The editors
might have intentionally chosen to publish the articles together because they conflicted.
8 Charles L. Barzun, Getting Substantive: A Response to Posnerand Vermeu, 80 U. CI. L. REv.
DIALOGUE 267 (2013) [hereinafter Response].
9 Id. at 286-90.
10 Id. at 286-88.
11 NATALIE GOLDBERG, WRITING DoWN THE BONEs 25 (2d ed. 2005).
12 Id.
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in judicial decision making cannot be tamed regardless of how a scholar
attacks it.
At the outset, it might help to explain certain terms, especially as
they relate to the distinction between law and politics. Most important,
and as will be elaborated, the fundamental law-politics distinction is
more slippery than is often assumed. Some political scientists who
study adjudication, particularly Supreme Court decision making adopt a
narrow definition of politics for purposes of their quantitative studies.
They might maintain that a justice votes in accord with politics if he or
she votes pursuant to his or her policy preferences or political attitudes." The political scientist might then derive the justice's preferences, attitudes, or ideology from newspaper characterizations (during
the nomination and confirmation process) or the political party of the
appointing president. 14 Even so, the key distinction in many analyses of
adjudication is between proper and improper considerations. That is,
does the judge (or justice) consider proper or improper factors when
deciding a case? The identification of proper and improper factors is
typically derived from an internal rather than external viewpoint. Arguably, within the practice of law and adjudication, judges are supposed
to decide cases pursuant to legal rules or doctrines derived from case
precedents, statutes, or other legal texts. A decision grounded on legal
rules or doctrines is proper, but a decision based on other factors is improper. What might those other factors be? Frequently, they are politics, narrowly defined, but they can be anything other than traditional

13

See Robert E. Goodin & Hans-Dieter Klingemann, PolitkalScknce: T/e Dircipine,in A NEW

HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 3, 7-9 (1996) (discussing nature of politics); se genera/
JEFFREY A. SEGAL& HAROLD

J. SPAETH,

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL

(1993).
14 JEFFREY A. SEGAL ET AL., THESUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN LEGALSYsrEM 319
(2005) (rdying on newspaper editorials); see gearally CAss R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES
PoLtriCAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006) (study of Court of
Appeals relying on party of appointing president). For an extensive discussion of different
measurements of political ideology, see LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., Til

BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL

JUDGES (2013).

1s See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 86-88 (1961) (distinguishing internal and external
views).
16 See HENRY M. HART,JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE

MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 164-67 (1st ed. 1958) (arguing that judges should use "reasoned elaboration" to decide cases); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Prinayks of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 15-35 (1959) (arguing that judges should decide constitutional issues
pursuant to "neutral principles").
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legal rules, doctrines, and texts." For instance, a decision arising from
the religious and cultural backgrounds of a judge would be improper."
Such a decision is improper precisely because it is based on factors that
are supposedly external to the legal process. Proper and improper considerations, in other words, can also be called, respectively, internal (inside or proper) or external (outside or improper). Indeed, from the internal standpoint, any external consideration can be called political,
loosely defined. If a Protestant judge consistently holds against Muslim
Free Exercise complainants, that.outlook can be deemed political, even
if it is unrelated to the Republican or Democratic parties." In this broad
sense, law and politics are opposed, standing on their own respective
sides of a crucial boundary. Meanwhile, scholarly analyses of judicial decision making can also be distinguished as internal or external An internal analysis revolves around the rules and doctrines that are appropriate or proper considerations from the inside of legal and judicial
processes. An external analysis focuses on factors that are deemed improper from the inside of legal and judicial processes. With regard to
examinations of Supreme Court adjudication, a political scientist's study
focusing on politics is an external analysis, while a law professor's study
focusing on rules and precedents is an internal analysis.
I dwell on this terminology partly because Barzun, Posner, and
Vermeule occasionally invoked distinctions that are misleading or beside the point. For instance, at one stage of his argument, Barzun maintained that he was not concerned with the law-politics dichotomy. Rather, he claimed, his analysis focused on the distinction between proper
and improper considerations for adjudication. 20 He offered two examples of improper considerations: decisions based on "the judge's personal gain or in naked racial animus." 21 But Barzun's argument would
become trite if he were truly focused on such a limited set of (obvious17 See Lee Epstein et al., T& Political (Science) Context ofJudging, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 783, 798
(2003) ("judges make choices in order to achieve certain goals.").
18 See Gregory C Sisk & Michael Heise, Musiem and Religious Lib1rt in tlx Era g9/11: EmpincalEiderreffromthe FedralCourtr, 98 IowA L. REv. 231 (2012) (lower court study concluding
American Muslims were at disadvantage in Free Exercise cases).
19 See Barry Friedman, The Poliics ofJudiialReiew, 84 Thx. L. RiFv. 257, 271 (2005) (defining
politics capaciously; see geeraley Gregory C Sisk et al, Searching for tlx Soul of Judkial
Decisiormaking:An Empiical Study of Relions Freedan Deciions, 65 O1-mo ST. L.J. 491 (2004) (lower court study concluding judge's religion is most salient factor affecting outcome of religious
freedom cases).
20 Barzun, supra note 1, at 1644.
21 Id. at 1645.
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ly) improper considerations. How many cases involve a judge deciding
in accord with a bribe? How many judges currently spout racist epithets
from the bench? Nowadays, when a critic denounces a judge or court
for deciding based on improper considerations, the critic most often
accuses the judge or court of being influenced by politics, sometimes in
subtle ways. Indeed, the predominant view among political scientists is
that Supreme Court justices persistently vote or decide in accord with
their politics rather than the law.2 Consequently, elsewhere in Impeaching
Precedent, Barzun repeatedly equates improper motivations with "political pressure.'m
Part I of this Essay examines Barzun's ImpeachingPrecedent. Barzun
sought to police the law-politics boundary but only after explicating the
nature of legal argument and judicial decision making. He argued that
extralegal factors can become legitimate legal considentions in certain
limited circumstances. In the end, Barzun wanted to protect the sanctity
of the law, properly defined. Part I turns to Posner and Vermeule's Inside or Outside. They, too, sought to police the law-politics boundary, but
for a different purpose. Posner and Vermeule wanted to encourage
consistency in scholarship. They argued that scholars who jump back
and forth between law and politics, between the inside and the outside,
slip into incoherence. Part III uncovers the tension between Barzun's
Impeaching P'rcedent and Posner and Vermeule's Inside or Outide. Although both articles aimed to police the law-politics boundary-to tame
the law- politics dynamic-Barzun's goal of shifting the boundary conflicted with Posner and Vermeule's goal of discouraging scholarly
movement between the two sides, the inside and the outside. Part IV
explores what the conflict between the two articles reveals about the
nature of adjudication and legal scholarship. While both articles sought
to subdue the law-politics dynamic that is integral to legal interpretation
and adjudication, the conflict between the articles inadvertently highlighted the dynamic. The juxtaposition of the two articles underscores
that legal scholars and political scientists are driven to try to tame the
law-politics dynamic, yet such efforts must inevitably fail. The conclusion recommends that scholars devote more energy to exploring rather

22 SEGAL & SPAETH, stipra note 13, at xv-xviii, 65; see Gabriel A. Almond, PoliticalScierre The
History of the Discipkne, in A NEw HANDBOOK OF POUTICAL SCIENCE 50, 68-75 (Robert E
Goodin & Hans-Dieter Klingemann eds., 1996) (discussing behavioral revolution in political
science).
23 Barzun, supranote 1, at 1626, 1671; see id at 1679 ("social or political pressure").
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than subduing the law-politics dynamic.
I.

PROTECTING THE SANCTITY OF THE LAW

Barzun's Impeaching Precedentdanced around and over the boundary
between law and politics, but in the end, was primarily concerned with
the internal practice of law and adjudication. Barzun began his article by
demonstrating how litigants sometimes use history as a clearly legitimate mode of legal argument 24 Philip Bobbitt made this point previously. He argued that judges, when deciding constitutional issues, invoke six "modalities of argument," including text and doctrine, but also
history.2 Most obviously, old originalists maintain that historical evidence of framers' intentions demonstrates fixed constitutional meaning
while new originalists argue that historical evidence of the original public meaning of the constitutional text is determinative.2 6
Regardless, Barzun was not especially interested in the patently legitimate uses of historical evidence. Instead, he asked this specific question: "When deciding whether to follow one of its precedents, should a
court consider historical evidence indicating that the precedent was decided on the basis of improper motivations or as the result of political
pressure?" 27 As Barzun emphasized, such a use of historical evidence
would be more controversial. Nevertheless, he offered several examples
of when Supreme Court justices suggested this invocation of history
would be appropriate.
For instance, in Seminole Tribe of Flonda v. Flonda, decided in 1996,
the Court held that the Commerce Clause did not empower Congress
to abrogate state sovereign immunity, protected under the Eleventh
Amendment.2 The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, relied on the 1890 decision, Hans v. Louisiana, as a foundation for interpreting the Eleventh Amendment 29 The Eleventh

24
25

Id. at 1633-36.
Pm-ilP BOBBITT,

12-13 (1991); see PlilP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAt. FATE 9-24 (1982) (discussing historical arguments).
26 E.g., ANTONIN SCAlIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 38 (1997) (using new originalism);
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Pririplerand Some FirstAmendwent Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (using
old originalism); see Stephen M. Feldman, ConstitutionalInterpretadon and History New Orginalim
orEclectrirm?,28 B.Y.U.J. PuB. L. 283,284-86 (2014) (distinguishingold and new oiginalisms).
27 Bar2un, supra note 1, at 1626.
28 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (overruling Pa. v. Union Gas Co., 491
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

U.S.1 (1989)).
29 Id. at 54-55, 64-65, 67-69.
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Amendment explicitly states that the federal judicial power "shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."3 Thus, the
Eleventh Amendment expressly bans suits based on diversity jurisdiction but does not expressly refer to federal question suits. Nevertheless,
Hans unanimously held that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal
question suits for damages brought against a state by its own citizens, as
well as by citizens of other states and foreign nations. 31 Yet, as many
scholars have argued, Hans is problematic from both theoretical and
historical standpoints. 32
Barzun's discussion of Semino/s Tribe emphasized the history surrounding Hans, which animated an exchange between Rehnquist and
Justice David Souter, who dissented in Seminole Tribe. Souter's dissent,
joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, maintained that Hans, the key
to the Seminole Tribe decision, could not justifiably be grounded on the
Eleventh Amendment. 4 Why did the Hans Court reach an unprincipled
3
conclusion? According to Souter, "history provides the explanation."s
The Court's institutional weakness during the post-Reconstruction Era
pressured the justices to decide incorrectly. 36 Hans claimed that Louisiana had violated the Contract Clause of the Constitution by changing
state law to avoid paying interest on state bonds." Louisiana replied
that the Eleventh Amendment barred Hans, a citizen of the state, from
suing. Like many former Confederate states, Louisiana had accumulated
enormous debt during Reconstruction by selling bonds to raise capital.
Before long, Louisiana and other states sought to repudiate their obliga-

30 U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.

Hans v. La., 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
John J. Gibbons, The Elewnth Amendment and State Soveregn Immunitc A Reinterpretadon, 83
COLUM. L. REv. 1889 (1983); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendwen and
State Soverejgn Immunity, 98 YALE L. J. 1 (1988); Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the
Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARv. L REV. 1342 (1989); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The PartcularlyDubi31
32

ous Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay on Law, Race, Histoy and 'Federal Courft," 81 N.C. L

REV. 1927 (2003).
33 Barzun, supra note 1, at 1629-30.
34 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 120-23 (Souter,

J.,

dissenting). Souter stated that the Court de-

cided Hans "on the basis of a principle not so much as mentioned in the Constitution." Id at
120 (Souter, J., dissenting).

35

Seminoe Tribe, 517 US. at 120 (Souter, J., dissenting).
36 Id. at 120-23 (Souter, J., dissenting).
3 Hans, 134 U.S. at 2
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tions under these bonds. 8 When Reconstruction ended, after the
Hayes-Tilden election compromise of 1877, federal troops withdrew
from the South.39 At that point, the federal government lacked the
power to enforce its mandates in the face of state resistance. If the
Court had upheld Hans's claim against Louisiana, the justices reasonably feared that the state would ignore the judicial decision and order.'
In fact, as Souter noted, Louisiana's brief to the Court warned the justices that the state would remain "recalcitrant." 4 1 Souter therefore concluded. "So it is that history explains, but does not honor, Hans.
Rehnquist's majority opinion in Seminole Tribe criticized Souter's
method of argument. Rehnquist wrote: "The dissent disregards our case
law [read- Hans] in favor of a theory cobbled together from law review
articles and its own version of historical events."43 In other words,
Rehnquist denigrated the dissent because Souter did not limit his critique of Hans to the internal view of adjudication. Souter was not solely
discussing legal rules or doctrines derived from case precedents, statutes, or other legal texts. From Rehnquist's perspective, Souter could
legitimately criticize Hans for misreading the text of the Eleventh
Amendment, to take one example, but Souter could not legitimately
criticize Hans by adopting an external view of the Court's adjudicative
process. In Rehnquist's words, Souter had provided an "extralegal explanation" of the Hans decision by exploring its historical and political
context." Ultimately, Rehnquist condemned Souter for doing "a disservice to the Court's traditional method of adjudication.
Barzun sought to demonstrate why Souter's argument-as well as
other similar political and historical arguments-should be deemed a
legitimate method for impeaching or discrediting a precedent, such as

38 On the bonds and their repudiation, see ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 383-88 (1988);
JOHN V. ORTHJUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN
AMERICAN HisTORY 53-57 (1987); Gibbons, supra note32, at 1969-78.
39 For discussions of the 1877 compromise, see FONER, supra note 38, at 575-87; STEPHEN

M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY162-63 (2008).
40 "Given the likelihood that a judgment against the State could not be enforced, it is not
wholly surprising that the Hans Court found a way to avoid the certainty of the State's contempt." Seminole T1ie, 517 U.S. at 121 (Souter, J., dissenting).
41 Id.
42 Id. at 122 (Souter, J., dissenting).
43 Id. at 68.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 69.
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Hans.4 Barzun, that is, sided with Souter over Rehnquist. Barzun did
not claim that political and historical discussions are always legitimate
modes of legal or constitutional argument. 47 Barzun devoted a large
chunk of his article to theoretical discussions of why and how stare
decisis operates in order to discern when such discussions of politics
and history should be relevant and legitimate.4 8 Because law is a practice
based "on sources of authority"' such as case precedents, Barzun concluded that a court, when weighing precedent, should consider political
and historical evidence that bears on whether the earlier decision "was
motivated by 'extralegal' considerations."so If, for example, evidence
shows that improper extralegal considerations motivated the Supreme
Court justices in an earlier decision, then that decision should carry less
precedential weight. Hence, from Barzun's perspective, the Hans
Court's political concerns about institutional weakness during the postReconstruction Era should legitimately bear on the strength of Hans as
precedent-just as Souter maintained in Seminole Tibe.
Why did Barzun make this argument? He wanted to police the
boundary between law and politics, between the inside and outside of
legal argument But his argument was multilayered. Although Barzun
wanted to police the boundary, he wanted to move it first. Pursuit of
his argument, Barzun stated, "requires breaking down the boundaries
that sometimes divide various subdisciplines of law, including historical,
doctrinal, and philosophical scholarship."" Hence, in Seminole Tribe,
Rehnquist castigated Souter for using extralegal political and historical
evidence, but Barzun explained why a court can sometimes legitimately
consider such political and historical evidence. In a sense, Barzun
sought to specify circumstances when a type of extralegal argument
could be brought into the legal fold. The extralegal would become le46 "My claim, in short, is that the effort to historicize or impeach a past decision is a legitimate and potentially useful means of evaluating a decision's authority as a matter of precedent"
Barzun, supra note 1, at 1631.
47 Barzun stated that such political and historical discussions were relevant only "under certain circumstances." Id. at 1672. Thus, he explored when legal practice would "authorize" such
considerations. Id. at 1655.

48 Id. at 1645-72
49 Id. at 1680.
50 Id. at 1672
51 Id. at 1631. Barzun admitted: "Adjudication-particularly constitutional adjudication, but
not only there-is already rife with deep and pervasive disagreement, reflected in the frequent
splits on the Supreme Court, about what counts as valid sources of law and methods of interpretation." Id at 1675.
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gal.52 Barzun wanted to bring Souter's political and historical critique of
Hans within the internal view of adjudication. But then Barzun would
raise the fence again, and the boundary between the inside and the outside, between law and politics, would be intact. What political and historical evidence would be welcome into the sphere of legal argument?
Evidence showing that improper considerations, such as political concerns, had motivated a court would be permissible. In other words,
even though Barzun shifted the boundary between inside and outside,
he ultimately reiterted that certain considerations were improper, outside, and extralegal. If Barzun had his way, he would transform the political and historical into the legal, but only in certain limited situations.
As Barzun stated, "what is in dispute is precisely the character of legal
argument." 3 He was not concerned equally with the respective natures
of law and politics. In the end, he wanted to protect the inside, to uphold the sanctity of law.
II.

MAINTAINING CONSISTENCY

In Inside or Outside the System?, Posner and Vermeule called for consistency in scholarship. They pointed out that "the behavioral premises
of economics, psychology, and political science" have increasingly influenced legal scholars over the previous four decades. 4 For example,
most economists assume that individuals act rationally in their own selfinterest." This assumption has animated much public law scholarship,
particularly as manifested in public choice theory. Public choice theorists assume that all government officials, including members of Congress, rationally pursue their own self-interest. When legislators debate
a bill, they calculate whether enactment will promote or diminish their
chances for re-election." They do not act in pursuit of a common good
or public interest. By following this public choice approach, theorists
52 "Iihere is no reason why historicist interpretations that explain awaywhole lines of the
Court's past doctrine as a product of social, political, or economic forces could not be central to

its interpretive approach." Id. at 1680.
s3 Id.
54 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1796.
ss ROBIN PAUL MAijoY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THEORY
AND PRACTICE 54 (1990); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-4 (7th ed. 2007).
56 DANIELA. FARBER & PmuPP. FRICKEY, LAWANDPUBLIC CHOICE 1-11 (1991) (summarizing public choice theory); DANIEL STEDMAN JONES, MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE: 1AYEK,
FRIEDMAN, AND THE BIRTH OF NEOLIBERAL POLITICS 126-32 (2012) (discussing public choice
and rational choice theories).
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have demonstrated that majority voting, as in democracy, is frequently
an irrational means for making group decisions. Democratic decision
making cannot maximize the satisfaction of individual interests, at least
under certain conditions.5 ' Thus, public choice theorists maintain that
when the government legislates-for example, by imposing environmental regulations-the legislative decisions do not rest on a rational
calculation of costs and benefits. They arise from interest group maneuvers rather than social utility.ss
This type of scholarship is prototypical external scholarship-that
is, it views the government process from the outside rather than the inside. Legislators might believe and declare that they are acting for the
common good or on principle, but public choice theorists ignore such
declarations (unless they regard the declarations as subterfuge intended
to promote the legislator's self-interest). This external scholarship has
obviously influenced Posner and Vermeule. Their own writings often
reflect such an outlook. Yet, in Inside or Outside, they also respect internal scholarship-that is, scholarship that adopts the viewpoints of actors on the inside of public institutions, including Congress and the judiciary. Hence, Posner and Vermeule do not categorically repudiate
traditional law review articles whose authors discuss whether the Supreme Court justices correctly interpreted precedents and constitutional
text. 0 In another coauthored article, which defended traditional (internal) legal scholarship from an external political science attack, Vermeule
wrote: "Legal scholars often are just playing a different game than the
57

See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 56, at 38-62 (explaining Arrow's Theorem); WILLIAM

H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST PoPuisM 1 (1982) (arguing social choice theory calls democracy into question).
58 E.g., Frank Easterbrook, Statues' Domains, 50 U. Cin. L. REV. 533 (1983) (arguing courts
should not presume that legislative decisions are rational); George Stigler, The Theof of Economic
Regulaion, 2 BELL J. ECoNOMICS 3 (1971) (discussing regulatory capture). The economist
Mancur Olson was a leader in exploring collective action problems in government. MANCUR
OLSON, TIlE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982); MANCUR OLSoN, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION (2d ed. 1971).
s9 E.g., MATHI-EW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS (2006); ADRIAN VERMEUIE, THlE SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTION (2011); Eric Posner
& Alan 0. Sykes, InternaionalLaw and the Limits ofMa-roeronomkc Cooperation, 86 S. CAL. L. REV.
1025 (2013); Adrian Vermeule The Inviribk Hand in Legal and PoliticalTheo, 96 VA. L. REV. 1417
(2010).
60 Many law reviews are filled with such traditional legal scholarship. E.g., Lawrence J.
MacDonnell, Integrating Use of Groundand Surface Water in Wyoming, 47 IDAHO L. REv. 51(2010);
Robert A. Sedler, Understandingtle Estabishment Cause: The Perpreciveof ConsitutionalLitjation, 43
WAYN EL. REV. 1317 (1997).
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empiricists play, which means that no amount of insistence on the empiricists' rules can indict legal scholarship-any more than strict adherence to the rules of baseball supports an indictment of cricket.""
The gist of Posner and Vermeule's article, Inside or Outside, is that
when a scholar adopts a particular approach or method at the beginning of an article, he or she should consistently follow that same method throughout the entire article. When a scholar fails to maintain consistency, the scholar is guilty of the "inside/outside fallacy," to use
Posner and Vermeule's terminology.6 2 "The inside/outside fallacy occurs when the theorist equivocates between the external standpoint of
an analyst of the constitutional order, such as a political scientist, and
the internal standpoint of an actor within the system, such as a judge.""
In articulating the inside/outside fallacy, Posner and Vermeule drew inspiration from economists who have identified a "determinacy paradox."6" The determinacy paradox can arise whenever an analyst (or reformer) explicitly or implicitly views an institution from more than one
perspective. Suppose the analyst criticizes the institution from perspective 1, which asserts that specific causal factors determine behavior
within that institution The analyst cannot switch to perspective 2 to
recommend solutions if that latter perspective disregards the perspective 1 causal factors. Institutional actors could not suddenly or magically
escape the power of the perspective 1 causal factors.6 ' To the contrary,
those factors determine behavior (according to perspective 1). 6 Posner
and Vermeule want to import the determinacy pamdox into legal theory, though they prefer the term, inside/outside fallacy, when discussing
61 Jack Goldsmith & Adrian Vermeule, EmpiricalMethodology and LeplScholarshp, 69 U. Cm.
L.REv. 153,153-54 (2002).
62 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1745-46.
63 Id. at 1745.
64 Id. at 1747.
65 See Thrainn Eggertsson, State Reforms and the Theory of Instituional Polky, 19 REvisrA
DE
EcONOMIAPOLITICA 49 (1999); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1747.
66 Posner and Vermeule described the determinacy paradox as follows:

If the analyst endogenou sly derives the behavior of actors within the system for purposes of diagiosis, the analyst must also endogenize those actors' response to any
advice the analyst might give. If the analyst stands outside the system for purpose of
diagnosis, it is inconsistent to assume an internal standpoint for purpose of prescription, with the narrow exception of strictly instrumental advice about how rationally
self- interested actors may best promote their interests.
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1747.
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law.67
When a legal scholar falls prey to the inside/outside fallacy, the
reader is confronted with "a kind of methodological schizophrenia." 68
As Posner and Vermeule elaborated the typical article suffering from
the inside/outside fallacy[TJhe diagnostic sections of a paper draw upon the political science
literature to offer deeply pessimistic accounts of the ambitious, partisan, or self- interested motives of relevant actors in the legal system, while the prescriptive sections of the paper then turn around
and issue an optimistic proposal for public-spirited solutions.
For example, in Ways of Criiciing the Court, Frank H. Easterbrook
argued, from an external (public choice) viewpoint, that the Supreme
Court could not reach consistent outcomes in Establishment Clause
cases because collective action problems infect any multi-member institution, such as the Court, that decides pursuant to majority voting.7 If
Easterbrook had concluded his article by advocating that one particular
Establishment Clause position is best in principle and that, therefore,
the Court should follow it, he would have been guilty of the in-

Posner and Vermeule's claim to draw insight from economics for the inside/outside fallacy underscores their leanings toward external views of the legal process. Going back to at least
the 1930s, numerous scholars who have focused on law and judicial institutions, including law
professors as well as political scientists, have examined the relationships between the internal
and external views. John Dickinson, Legal Rules: Thir Funcion in ti Process of Decision, U. PENN.
L. REV. 833 (1931); Feldman, Achemy, supra note 6; Feldman, Harmoning, supra note 6; Howard
Gillman, The Courtas an Ide4 Not a.Building (ora Game): Interpretive Insitutionalirm and tn Analyris
67

NEW
of Supreme Court Deasion-Making, in SUPREME COURT DEcisioN-MAKING:
INsTrruTIONAusT APPROACHEs 65 (Cornell W. aayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) [herein-

&

&

after Gillman, Ika]; Howard Gillman, What's Law Got to Do With It?JudiialBehatioralist Test tlr
'LegalModel' of juddal Decision Making, 26 L & Soc. INQUIRY 465 (2001) [hereinafter Gillman,
What; Mark A. Graber, ConsitutionalPolitsand ConrtitutionalTheoy: A Misundentood and Neglected
Relaionshi, 27 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 309 (2002); Whittington, supra note 6; see Frank B. Cross
Blake J. Nelson, Strategic InsitutionalEffect on Supreme Court Dedsionmaking, 95 Nw. U. L REv.
1437 (2001) (law professor and political scientist argue that quantitative study shows that Supreme Court decision making is based on both law and politics). In fact, at one point, Posner
and Vermeule explained that they preferred the term inside/outside fallacy over the term determinacy paradox, because the former "underscores that, in such cases, the analyst confuses internal and external perspectives-traditionally a central issue for legal theory." Posner
Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1789 (dting H.LA. Hart's classic distinction of the internal and external, HART, supra note 15, at 86-88).
68 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1745.
69 Id.
70 Frank H. Easterbrook Way of Critingti Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802(1982).
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side/outside fallacy."1 Easterbrook's own external argument-that the
justices cannot decide Establishment Clause issues consistentlyprecluded such a conclusion, which would be based on an internal
viewpoint.
Posner and Vermeule focused on a more complex example, an article entitled Separation ofPaies, Not Powen, co-authored by DarylJ. Levinson and Richard H. Pildes. 72 Levinson and Pildes emphasized that
many constitutional scholars accept a Madisonian conception of separation of powers. As James Madison explained in his Federalist essays,
non-virtuous officials in each fedeal branch would seek to aggrandize
power to their own respective branch 74 Members of Congress would
seek to protect and expand congressional prerogatives, while the president would seek to protect and expand executive branch powers. But
the ambitions of Congress would offset those of the president, and vice
versa. Institutional rivalries would prevent any one branch from accumulating excessive power and tyrannizing the people. But Levinson and
Pildes argued that this description of separation of powers does not account for the significant role of political parties in our government system." Levinson and Pildes draw on political science research to
demonstrate that, in most contexts, an official's party, whether Democratic or Republican, is far more important than an official's branch of
government. Loyalty to party, not loyalty to federal branch, motivates
congressional and executive branch officials. More specifically, in a period of divided government, where Republicans control one branch and
Democrats control the other, the two branches will frequently and
strongly oppose each other. In these circumstances, separation of powers works roughly to check and balance the legislative and executive
branches. Competition between parties, however, not between branches, produces this type of separation of powers. But in a period of unified government, where one party controls the presidency and both
houses of Congress, then the two branches will generally support and
cooperate with each other. In these instances, Congress will not strongEasterbrook did not make this mistake.
Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 H-ARv. L. REV.
2311 (2006); see Posner & Vermeule, stpra note 1, at 1755-59 (discussing Levinson and Pildes's
article).
73 Levinson & Pildes, sipra note 72, at 2316-25.
74 TI FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77-84 (James Madison), No.51, at 320-25 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
75 Levinson & Pildes, supra note 72, at 2325-29.
71

72
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ly oppose the president, nor vice versa. With unified government, in
other words, separation of powers does not effectively check or balance
the executive and legislative branches. Indeed, in times such as today,
where we have highly polarized and ideologically united parties, unified
government would shrink separation of powers to nothingness.6
In Inside or Outside, Posner and Vermeule agreed with Levinson and
Pildes's insights into the functioning of separation of powers. 7 Even
so, Posner and Vermeule were less interested in Levinson and Pildes's
insights than in the structure of their article, Separadon of Paries, Not
Powers. Posner and Vermeule emphasized that Levinson and Pildes's
"diagnosis rests on an external account of the system of partisan competition, one that draws upon political science and economics to explain the motivations of actors in the constitutional order." 7 Posner
and Vermeule had no problem with that external diagnosis. Their concerns arose when, in the latter part of Separation of Parties, Not Powers,
Levinson and Pildes began recommending "proposals for ameliorating
the harms of unified govemment" 79 According to Posner and
Vermeule, Ievinson and Pildes switched to an internal perspective in
this section of their article, and thus they tripped over the inside/outside fallacy.
For instance, Levinson and Pildes argued that, because ideologically united parties undermine the separation of powers, actions diminishing party unity would help restore effective checks and balances." But
Posner and Vermeule point out that aperson or group has to take action
to diminish party unity. The passive voice allows an author to avoid
specifying the subject who takes such action, but the active voice requires the author to identify the acting subject"' Levinson and Pildes
maintained that one way to diminish party unity would be to reduce the
number of safe congressional districts. A safe district is one that is so
full of either registered Republicans or registered Democrats that elec-

76 Levinson and Pildes "emphasize that the degree and kind of competition between the legislative and executive branches vary significantly, and may all but disappear, depending on
whether the House, Senate, and presidency are divided or unified by political patty." Id. at 2315;
se MORRIS P. FIORINA ET AL., CULTURE WARTHE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA (2005)
(discussing polarization).
7 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1755-56.
78 Id. at 1756.
7 Id.
so Levinson & Pildes, supra note 72, at 2380-83.
81 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1758-59.
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tion results are foregone conclusions. 82 Who, however, would act to reduce the number of safe districts? asked Posner and Vermeule." In
many states, the state legislature establishes congressional districting
Just like in Congress, though, ideologically united parties control many
state legislatures. If one follows the external political science view, emphasizing party loyalty and power, then a state legislature has little incentive to draw district lines that would reduce the number of safe congressional districts." To be sure, Levinson and Pildes argued that in a
state with a referendum or initiative process, such as California, voters
might be able to bypass the state legislature. Yet, this solution would
work only in those states with such legislature-bypass procedures, and
even in those states, only if the voters themselves were motivated to
jump through the hoops needed to change the system." In many states,
then, change would not come unless state legislators wanted a change.
Thus, insofar as Levinson and Pildes suggested that state legislators
should act in accord with principle, so that separation of powers would
be invigorated, they were switching to an internal view. And that was
Posner and Vermeule's point Levinson and Pildes's critique of separation of powers in our party-dominated system was based on an external
view, but their prescriptions for improving separation of powers were
based on internal views.
Levinson and Pildes also recommended that the Supreme Court
adopt a "default rule" that would help invigorate separation of powers.86 They explained that, in the post 9/11 cases, the Court had embraced "the Madisonian expectation that Congress will compete aggressively with the President for power and vigilantly monitor and check
presidential decisionmaking" 87 Consequently, the Court broadly construed congressional actions as authorizing novel executive actions in
the "war on terror."" But the Court, Levinson and Pildes pointed out,
did not account for party cohesion in a time of unified government.

82 Levinson & Pildes, supra note 72, at 2380.

83 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1759.
84 See Levinson & Pildes, spra note 72, at 2382 (discussing how California state legislators
resisted pressure to switch to open primaries).
85 See id at 2382-83 (discussing changes implemented in California through an initiative,
which was subsequently held unconstitutional in Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567

(2000)).
86 Levinson & Pildes, supra note 72, at 2354.
87 Id. at 2351.
88 Id. at 2351-52
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Thus, they recommended a default judicial rule that would account for
the influence of political parties on the separation of powers:
When it is not clear whether congressional statutes prohibit the executive action at issue or simply do not address it, and Congress is
controlled by the President's political party, perhaps courts should
follow [a rule] tilting toward prohibiting presidential action (particularly when that action amounts to a novel expansion of executive
power)."

'

Such a rule would manifest an assumption that, in a unified government, the president can readily gain congressional support and approval." Simultaneously, "the flipside of [this] default rule might be that
courts should more generously construe statutes as supporting executive authoritywhen government is divided." 9
Once again, Posner and Vermeule criticized Levinson and Pildes
for recommending a solution that depended on disregard for their initial external viewpoint Levinson and Pildes's argument assumed that
Supreme Court justices would adopt the recommended judicial default
rule because of, in Posner and Vermeule's words, "public-spirited judging" rather than party loyalty. 92 The justices, that is, would supposedly
seek to improve government functioning, particularly with regard to
separation of powers. But Posner and Vermeule asked, "Why should
the judges be any different?"93 Much political science research, as Posner and Vermeule pointed out, demonstrates that party ideologies
strongly influence judges, particularly Supreme Court justices.94 For example, if the majority of justices are Republican appointees, then an analyst should not expect the Court to adopt a rule that would restrain a
Republican president-whether it is called a default rule or otherwise.
Posner and Vermeule observed: "If the system is structured and pervaded by partisan competition, as Professors Levinson and Pildes argue, then one cannot turn around and assume that the judges will be
immune." 95

Posner and Vermeule did not seek to repudiate Levinson and
89 Id. at 2354.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Posner & Vermeule,
9

Id.

94

Id

9 Id. at 1757-58.

supra note 1,

at 1757.
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Pildes's entire argument To the contrary, Posner and Vermeule appeared to admire and agree with Levinson and Pildes's external analysis
of separation of powers. Party ideology and loyalty, in fact, wreak havoc
on the Madisonian system of checks and balances. Posner and
Vermeule aimed to encourage scholarly consistency. If an author-or
co-authors, such as Levinson and Pildes-analyzes an institution and
identifies a problem from an external standpoint, then the author
should not prescribe a solution from a standpoint internal to the institution. If the author does so, then he or she is guilty of the inside/outside fallacy. Posner and Vermeule concluded on a bleak note:
"It follows from what we have said that political science and law may
have less to say to one another than many constitutional theorists currently suppose.
When law professors and political scientists attempt
to enrich each other's understandings of government institutions, their
"talk across disciplines constantly threatens to descend into incohe rence.'m Ultimately, then, Posner and Vermeule sought to police the
boundary between law and politics, between the inside and outside. To
them, the boundary was sharp and fixed. If a scholar started on one
side of the line, then the scholar needed to stay on that side, at least for
the duration of the particular article or book.
III.

THE CONFLICT

The conflict between Barzun's Impeaching Precedent and Posner and
Vermeule's Inside or Outside can now be uncovered. Barzun, on the one
hand, and Posner and Vermeule, on the other hand, shared overlapping
goals. They sought to police the boundary between law and politics, between the inside and outside. Their reasons for doing so, however, differed considerably. Barzun wanted to contest the boundary. He wanted
to bring extralegal considerations within the legal realm, and then reconstruct the fence between the legal and political sides. Basically, he
wanted to maintain the boundary but only after moving it. Posner and
Vermeule had no interest in contesting the boundary between law and
politics. To them, the boundary was clear. The law was on one side, on
the inside of legal and judicial practices.
Politics was on the other side, on the outside of legal and judicial
practices. The crux of their argument was that too many scholars jump

96

Id. at 1797.

9

Id.
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back and forth, between the two sides. When scholars did so, they were
guilty of the inside/outside fallacy and rendered their arguments incoherent.
Barzun recognized that Posner and Vermeule's thesis threatened
his argument. In Getting Substantiv: A Response to Posner and Vermeule,
Barzun criticized Inside or Outidde in multiple interrelated ways." I focus
here on one key criticism because it eventually reveals the deep tensions
between their respective arguments. Posner and Vermeule repeatedly
claimed that "[n]othing in our argument is substantive, or empirical."99
They claimed neutrality. They supposedly favored neither an internal
view of legal and judicial practices, emphasizing adherence to the rule
of law, nor an external view, emphasizing that judges follow their own
self-interest or political ideologies. Posner and Vermeule merely wanted
a scholar to choose oneview and stick to it. Barzun, though, argued that
Posner and Vermeule were disingenuous in claiming neutrality. They, in
fact, favored the extemalview.
Barzun was correct, to a degree. At several spots in Inside or Outidde,
Posner and Vermeule prioritized the external view. For instance, at one
point, Posner and Vermeule suggested that even if judges believe they
decide according to the rule of law or the public good, they do not necessarily do so. Political ideology is the puppeteer controlling the judgemarionettes. "[f]udges need not . .. subjectively experience themselves

as casting votes along partisan lines; the mechanism operates behind
0 Elsewhere,
the judges' backs, through bias rather than ill intentions."o'
Posner and Vermeule stated: "[fudges do not stand outside the system
[of self-interested partisan action]; judicial behavior is an endogenous
product of the system."1 02 Yet, the thrust of Inside or Outside was unquestionably to plead for scholarly consistency, not to advocate in favor
of an external (political science) view. Thus, even though Posner and
Vermeule encouraged scholarly consistency, they were guilty of inconsistency. They sometimes adopted a neutral stance, neither favoring the
inside nor the outside, but other times, they favored the outside.
Why did Posner and Vermeule occasionally prioritize the external

Response, sapra note 8.
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1796. For similar statements, see id. at 1745, 174849,1778, 1797.
100 Response, supra note 8, at 273-74, 284, 288.
101 Posner & Vermeule, sprfa note 1, at 1757.
98

99

102

Id. at 1764.
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view despite aiming for neutrality? Because they understood the external
view as a type of trump card. Once it is played, it defeats all other cards
on the table, regardless of their suit or rank. The external view is the
joker that changes the entire game."' From Posner and Vermeule's perspective, once a scholar acknowledges that any government officials
pursue self-interest, then the scholar must assume that all government
officials pursue self-interest. When they criticized Levinson and Pildes's
Separationof Partiei,NotPowers, Posner and Vermeule argued that if Levinson and Pildes maintained that some legislators pursue self-interest or
partisan advantage, then Levinson and Pildes must assume that all legislators act similarly. A scholar should not assume that Congress functions in accord with party ideologies but that state legislatures pursue
higher principles." Yet, Posner and Vermeule pushed their argument
further by crossing institutional lines. They argued that if Levinson and
Pildes maintained that legislators pursue self-interest, then Levinson
and Pildes must assume that judges do so also. If government officials
in one institution follow party ideology, then officials in all institutions
necessarily follow party ideology. Consequently, if members of Congress follow partisan lines, Supreme Court justices do the same."
As Barzun recognized, this cross-institutional argument was problematic.' 6 Different institutions can operate differently. In fact, one can
distinguish one institution from another precisely because they follow
different rules and practices and pursue different goals. We can distinguish baseball from cricket because they have different rules, practices,
and goals, even though both are sports that feature a batter trying to hit
a thrown ball. Likewise, a scholar can distinguish legislatures from
courts even though both are government institutions. In a pluralist democracy, self-interest and party ideology might drive members of Congress, but the rule of law might nonetheless constrain Supreme Court
justices.' 7 After all, federal judges are politically insulated. They have
lifetime appointments and protected salaries. Alexander Bickel argued
years ago that even if legislators are constantly subject to political pres103 I refer to the joker here as the ultimate trump rather than as a wild card.
104 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1756, 1759; see Levinson & Pildes, supra note 72, at
2382-83 (discussing state legislatures and primary rules).
105 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1756-58; see Levinson & Pildes, supra note 72, at

2354-55 (discussing judicial default rule).
106 Response, supra note 8, at 274-77.
107 Id. at 274-75; see HART & SACKS, supra note 16, at iii-iv, 2-4 (emphasizing different institutions).
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sures, the Supreme Court's political insulation allows the justices to reason about and articulate enduring principles.'s
Barzun acknowledged that Posner and Vermeule anticipated and
criticized this type of argument, distinguishing legislative and judicial
institutionsY? Posner and Vermeule insisted that even if federal judges
are insulated from political pressure, then "[t]hat insulation liberates the
judges to indulge their preferences [and] the preferences that are indulged may themselves be partisan ones." 0 In other words, when
pushed, Posner and Vermeule reacted by prioritizing the external view
and politics. "Judges are inside the political system," they wrote, "not
outside it.""' Thus, Posner and Vermeule played the political science
trump card. "The literature in political science on the determinants of
judicial voting finds a strong partisan influence. [The] single best predictor of judicial votes in cases where there is disagreement is generally
the political party of the appointing president."112
One might criticize Bickel's argument-in fact, the later Bickel
questioned his earlier faith in the Court's capacity to identify enduring
principles" 3-but that does not render his (or a similar) argument incoherent, as Posner and Vermeule would suggesL11 4 A Bickel-like argument would look incoherent only if the external political science view
acts like a joker, trumping all other cards. From that perspective, as
soon as Bickel acknowledged that self-interested partisan politics channel congressional actions, he must assume that self-interested partisan
politics channel all government institutions, including the Court. Any
scholarly switching between the inside and outside, between law and
politics, is likely to descend into nonsense. As Posner and Vermeule put
it, "analysts who speak both as political scientists and as legal theorists
must be careful not to switch their hats so rapidly that they end up attempting to wear two hats at the same time.""s

08 AIlEXANDERM.BICKEL,TIELEASTDANGEROUSBRANCH 24-25,58(1962).
109 Response, supm note 8, at 275-76.
110 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1757.
11 Id.
112 Id.

113 AIEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 99, 165 (Yale

U. Press ed., 1978) (1970).
114 See Posner & Vermeule, supm note 1, at 1797 ("talk across disciplines constantly threatens
to descend into incoherence"). Posner and Vermeule did not expressly discuss or even cite Bick-

el, though they attacked a Bickel-like argument Id. at l757-58.
115 Posner & Vermeule, sipra note 1, at 1757-58.
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Posner and Vermeule's reaction to the Bickel-like position revealed why Barzun saw Inside or Outide as a threat Barzun sought to
demonstrate that discussions of the outside can be relevant on the inside, at least in certain limited circumstances. Barzun wanted to contest
the boundary between law and politics. As he explained in his Response
to Posner and Vermeude, "what kinds of arguments can and cannot be
made from 'inside' the legal system is constantly an open and contested
question.""' Thus, Barzun sought to specify circumstances when a
court could legitimately consider extralegal political and historical evidence as a means of impeaching a precedent. But as Barzun realized,
Posner and Vermeule might have condemned his attempt to move between the inside and outside, even if Barzun's hopping between inside
and outside was only temporary. When Barzun moved from one side to
the other, he might have tripped over Posner and Vermeule's inside/outside fallacy.
Moreover, whereas Posner and Vermeule sometimes prioritized
the external, Barzun ultimately emphasized the internal. Indeed, Barzun
insisted that legal scholars are themselves on the inside, and that they
should recognize the role they play in the practice of law and adjudication. Legal scholars are never "outside the system," according to Barzun.11 7 Legal scholars, he wrote, "contribute (even if in small ways) to
the development of those same legal norms that they analyze and
comment on.""' Barzun even suggested that legal scholars should attempt to bolster faith in the rule of law regardless of contrary evidence.
"[What divides legal scholars is not so much the 'perspective' they
adopt but rather their relative willingness to hold onto a set of expectations for lawyers, politicians, judges, or legal scholars like themselves,
even in the face of evidence that those expectations frequently and repeatedly go unmet."'1 Consequently, while Barzun wanted to contest
the boundary between law and politics, his final goal was to rebuild the
fence dividing the inside from the outside. A legal scholar or judge can
contest the boundary, but wherever the boundary is placed, the sanctity

116 Response, supra note 8, at 286.
Id. at 289.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 289-90. Barzun's argument here is reminiscent of Paul Carrington's argument that
critical legal scholars should not be allowed to teach in law schools because they will destroy students' faith in the rule of law. Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and ftx River, 34 J. LEGAL EDuc. 222
(1984).
"7
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of the inside must be respected.'"
IV.

FIGHTING THE ToFu

What does the conflict between Barzun's Impeaching Precedent and
Posner and Vermeule's Inside and Outside reveal about the nature of adjudication and legal scholarship? Each article, in its own way, attempts
to tame a law-politics dynamic that lies coiled at the core of judicial decision making.21 But rather than taming the dynamic, the conflicting
articles shine a spotlight onto the dynamic.
The law-politics dynamic exists because of the nature of legal interpretation. When judges, including Supreme Court justices, decide
cases, they must interpret legal texts, whether the Constitution, statutes,
case precedents, or otherwise. Legal interpretation is never mechanical.'" No algorithmic method reveals the correct meaning of the text."
Despite this lack of method, lawyers, judges, and law professors nonetheless can sincerely debate the right or best meaning of a text 24 Still,
no method can prove the right or best meaning as an objective fact
The interpretive process itself is the only path to the truth of a text.1 25 If
one believes that a proffered interpretation of a text is mistaken, then
one can offer reasons that might persuade the initial interpreter to ac-

120 As Barzun concluded, "if a sufficient number of lawyers and judges agree [with his argument about impeaching evidence], then what was once a paradigmatically 'external' explanatory
account may become a perfectly valid form of legal argument from the 'internal' perspective."
Response, supra note 8, at 287.
121 A growing number of scholars are exploring the law-politics dynamic.
Cross & Nelson,
supra note 67; Feldman, Alchemy, smpm note 6; Feldman, Harmoning, sutra note 6; BARRY
FRIEDMAN, TIE W1 .l OFTHE PEOPLE (2009); Gillman, Idka,supranote 67; Gillman, Wha4 supm
note 67; Graber, supra note 67; Whittington, supra note 6; see Lee Epstein et al., Are Even Unanimous Decirions in the United Staks Supmme Court Ideologkal?, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 699, 713 (2012)
(political scientist, law professor, and judge jointly labeling the Court "a mixed ideologicallegalistic judidal institution').
122 Gillman, What, sKpra note 67, at 485-86; see HANs-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND
METHoD xxi, 89, 137, 140, 144, 159, 164-65, 295, 309, 462, 477-91 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. 1989) (discussing how no method can lead unequivocally to an
interpretive truth); Stanley Fish, Fisb v. Hss, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1325 (1984) (explaininginterpretation).
123 GADAMER, supra note 122, at 295, 309, 365; Ronald Dworkin,
How Law is Li? literature,
in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 146, 160 (1985).
124 Ronald Dworkin, Is There Realy No Right Answer in Hard Cases?, in A MATTER
OF
PRINCIPLE 119(1985); see GADAMER, supra note 122, at 297-98 (discussing true textual meaning).
125 Jirgen Habermas, The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality
(1971), in JOSEF BILICiHER,
CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS 181, 183 (1980).
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cept a better textual reading. Yet, an ironclad proof is impossible. Legal
interpretation is not an arithmetic problem.1 26
A judge always interprets the text from within his or her horizon. 127 The interpretive horizon metaphorically connotes the range of
possible understandings that an individual brings to any text. An interpreter can see to the edge of the horizon but no farther. The concept of
the interpretive horizon resonates with a simple psychological point:
"All mental processing draws closely from one's background
knowledge." 128 But a judge's horizon or interpretive background is not a
private possession. It arises from the judge's experience and education
within a community (or communities) and the community's cultural
traditions. 129 Consequently, political ideology contributes strongly to a
judge's horizon, yet the horizon is not solely a matter of politics, narrowly defined. Religion and other cultural components all contribute. so
A judge who was educated at an American law school, practiced law,
and decided prior cases, understands and generally abides by the internal practices of law and adjudication. Those internal practices-the
know-how of the law--are part of the judge's horizon."' In most cases,
therefore, the judge will attempt in good faith to interpret the relevant
legal texts correctly. 32 But again, this interpretive process is not me126 See GADAMER, supra note 122, at 165, 294, 332, 372 (arguing that meaning is gleaned only
interpretation or understanding); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL

through

INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958) (rejecting the picture theory of lan-

guage); Stanley Fish, Dennis MartineZ and ti Uses of Theory, 96 YALEL.J. 1773,1779 (1987) (arguing against theory as "an abstract or algorithmic formulation that guides or governs practice
from a position outside any particular conception ofpractice').
127 GADAMER, supra note 122, at 282-84,302, 306.
128 Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coheretre in Legal Decirion-Making, 71 U.
CI. L. REV. 511, 536 (2004).
129 The Gadamerian concept of the horizon overlaps with Stanley Fish's concept of an interpretive community. STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLAss? 303-04 (1980); cf,
THOMAs S. Ku-IN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLLTTIONS 43-51 (2d ed. 1970) (explaining the concept of a paradigm).
130 See GADAMER, supra note 122, at 282-84, 295, 302-09 (discussing concept of the interpretive horizon); Simon, supra note 128, at 536 (discussing development of background beliefs).
131 "The very ability to formulate a [judiciall decision in terms that would be recognizably
legal depends on one's having internalized the norms, categorical distinctions, and evidentiary
criteria that make up one's understanding of what the law is." Stanley Fish, Still WIrongAfterAll
These Years, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 356, 360 (1989); see Steven D. Smith,.Belieirg
Like a Lauyer, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1041 (1999) (emphasizing that lawyers and judges remain committed to a traditional view of legal reasoning).
12 Gillman, Idea, supra note 67, at 80, Whittington, supra note 6, at 623; see STEVEN J.
BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH 35-68 (1992) (emphasizing judges' good faith responsibility
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chanical. The judge's political preferences (and religious and cultural
background) will influence the interpretive conclusions. This political
influence is not a corruption of the legal and judicial process; it is inherent to the process. 33 Thus, for example, when Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Ginsburg disagree about the proper interpretation of the
Commerce Clause and the scope of congressional power, neither justice
is lying or being disingenuous." To the contrary, each justice believes
that he or she is correctly interpreting the Constitution. Their interpretive horizons, though, shape their respective conclusions.
This description of legal interpretation underscores that law and
politics are always intertwined in the adjudicative process.' This lawpolitics dynamic presents a problem to law professors, political scientists, and other scholars interested in studying adjudication. Many
scholars display "irrational exuberance" in their efforts to describe and
study adjudication as either pure law or pure politics.'37 They seek to
deny one part of the law-politics dynamic and to focus exclusively on
the other. One reason for such exuberance is the drive for discipline.1 38
When a student is educated in an academic or professional discipline,
the student is simultaneously empowered and constrained. 39 The tools

to apply the law); BRIAN Z. TAMANA IA, BEYOND THE FORMALISr-REALIST DIViDE: THE ROLE
judges internalize a "commitment to engage in the good-faith application of the law').
133 See GADAMER, supra note 122, at 282-84, 302, 306 (explaining horizon); Habermas, supra
note 125, at 183 (explaining interpretation).
134 E.g., Natl Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (discussing the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act under the Commerce Clause); see Stephen M. Feldman,
Do Supreme Court Nominees Ije? The Politics ofAdjudkaion, 18 S. CAL INTERDISC. L. J. 17 (2008)
(discussing whether Supreme Court nominees and justiceslie).
135 For further discussions of interpretation, see Stephen M. Feldman, The Probkm of Criique:
Triangulaing Habermar, Derrid4 and Gadawer Wit/in Metawodernism, 4 CONTEMP. POL. Ti-iEORY
296,299-315 (2005); Stephen M. Feldman, MadeforExh Other The Inkrdependence of Deconstrudon
and PhilosophicalHermeneutks, 26 PIHL. & Soc. CRITICISM 51, 53-63 (2000).
136 See Feldman, Alchemy, supra note 6, at 78-83 (describing the emulsification of law and politics in Supreme Court adjudication).
OF POLITIcS IN JUDGING 194 (2010) (emphasizing that

137 Cf, ROBERT J. SHIll.ER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE ix, 1-2 (2d ed. 2005) (drawing title of

book from speechby Alan Greenspan); Feldman, Achemy, supm note 6, at 61-69 (tracing purist
approaches to the law-politics dichotomy).
138 See Eileen Braman & J. Mitchell Pickerill, Path Dependence in Studies ofLegal
Decision-Making,
in WHAT'S LAw GOT To Do WrrH IT? 114,117-18 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed, 2011) (explaining how members of disciplines follow their respective disciplinary methods).
139 On the development of professions and disciplines, see ANDREW ABBOTT, TIHE SYSTEM
OF PROFESSIONS (1988); MAGAI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A
SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977); DOROTiiY Ross, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCENC E
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or methods of the discipline-for instance, political science-enable
the student to study events or phenomena in a new and often enlightening way.'1 Novel insights into the events or phenomena become possible. At the same time, the student is trained to use the particular disciplinary tools rather than other tools or methods. If the disciplinary
methods cannot be brought to bear on a question, then the question is
not worth pursuing.' Indeed, a scholar who does not use the proper
methods is likely to be, in a literal sense, disciplined. Colleagues in the
field will not respect the rogue scholar's work.1 4 2 If the rogue seeks to
publish a paper in a peer-review journal, then colleagues will reject the
manuscript.1 43 For this reason, academic and professional disciplines
naturally tend to become increasingly specialized, isolated, and parochial
Thus, disciplinary methods channel scholars to understand phenomena, such as judicial decision making, in particular ways.1 45 The

(1991). Barzun has commented on the nature of disciplinary knowledge. Charles Barzun, Tle
Forgotten Foundations of Hart and Sacks, 99 VA. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (2013) [hereinafter Barzun, Forotten].
140 See HA-JOON CHANG, ECONOMICS: TIE USER'S GUIDE 3 (2014) (emphasizing how professions develop jargon as means for insiders to communicate).
141 See MICIIAEL A. BAILEY & FORREST MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED COURT: LAW,
POLITICS, AND THER DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE 3 (2011) (arguing that a useful model must be

testable); SEGAL, supra note 14, at 20-21 (arguing that, in political science, only research based on
a model that quantifiable data can falsifyis legitimate).
142 "[D]isciplinarity is not simply a matter of individual choice, the pursuit of individual interests, or an individualized search for truth Rather, it is the product of a set of social forces of
normalization and education." Jack Balkin, Interdscplinadyi~ as CooniZaion, 53 WAS-I. & LEE L.

REV. 949, 954 (1996).
143 See MICHELE LAMONT, How PROFESSORS THINK (2009) (comparing evaluative criteria in
different disciplines); RossJ. Corbett, PolitialTheory Within PolidcalSdetre,44 PS: Pot. SCI. AND
Pots. 565 (2011) (emphasizing that many political scientists try to exdude non-quantifiable or
non-falsifiable methods from the discipline).
144 STEVE FUILER, PHII.OSOPY, RHETORIC, AND THE END OF KNOWiEDGE 33 (1993); see

MAGEE, CONFESSIONS OF A PHILOSOPHER: A JOURNEY THROUGH WESTERN
PiiHILosoPi-iY 364-65 (1997) (discussing professionalization in philosophy). For example, the
discipline of economics assumes "the economy is autonomous from other social institutions,"
FRED BLOCK & MARGARET R. SOMERS, TIE POWER OF MARKET FUNDAMENTALISM 24 (2014).
145 Pierre Bourdieu has written extensively about an individual's entry into and participation
in an arena or field of power, including a profession or discipline. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Fore
of Law: Towarda Socidogy of/he Juidical.Hek, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805 (1987) (focusing on legal profession); DAVID SWARTZ, CULTURE AND POWER: THE SOCIOLOGY OF PIERRE BoURDIEU 117-42
(1997) (discussing Bourdieu and entry into a field of power); Christopher Tomlins, History in the
Americanjuridcal Field: Narrate,justfiation, and Explanadon, 16 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 323, 32425 (2004) (relating discipline of law to Bourdeiu).
BRYAN
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tools we possess direct or influence our outlook and behavior. If I have
a hammer, then I am looking for a nail. If I have a screwdriver, then I
am looking for a screw. If I have a hammer but find only a screw, I
probably will try hammering it anyway. The distinct disciplinary methods of law and political science inevitably push law professors and political scientists to perceive and study adjudication differently. In other
words, education or training in their respective and distinct disciplines
engenders different interpretive horizons for law professors and political scientists. Indeed, their respective disciplinary methods often push
law professors and political scientists to seek purity in adjudication.
Law professors have been educated to focus on the rule of law. They
were trained to parse cases, decipher complex statutes, and carefully
read the Constitution and other texts. Law professors were educated to
denounce politics as fouling the adjudicative process. Politics, from this
perspective, is foreign to judicial decision making.14 Meanwhile, political scientists have been educated to study and quantify politics, especially as manifested in government institutions. When political scientists
study the government institution of the courts, including the Supreme
Court, they are inclined to see politics at play. They are likely to be skeptical of judicial declarations concerning legal principles and doctrines.'47
These disciplinary urges lead to incessant efforts to tame the lawpolitics dynamic at the heart of adjudication. The nature of legal interpretation inextricably links law and politics. They are intimately intertwined in judicial decision making. Yet, law professors and political scientists have sought their own respective purities for decades, and they
will inevitably continue to do so in the future. Their disciplinary drives

For discussions of the development of law as an academic discipline, see BRUCE A.
KIMBAu.,TiHE INCEPTION OFTI-IE MODERN PROFESSIONALEDUCATI ON: C.C. LANGDELL 18261906 (2009); WILiAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN
146

AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION

(1994);

ROBERT

S.

STEVENs, LAW SCHooL: LEGAL EDUCATION

IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850ST TIE 1980s (1983); Stephen M. Feldman, 7e Tranformation ofan
Academk Discipline: Law Prfersom in tix Past and Future (or Toy Stcry Too), 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 471

(2004); Christopher Tomlins, Book Review, 59J. LEGALEDUc. 657 (2010).
147 For discussions of the development of the discipline of political science, see JOH-N G.
GUNNELL, THE DESCENT OF POITICAL THEORY (1993); Cyde Barrow, Politial Sciete, in
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCEs 310 (William A. Darity, Jr., ed, 2d
ed. 2008); Lee Epstein et al, Idolog and the Study ofjudicialBehavior, in IDEOLOGY, PSYCiiOLOGY,
AND LAW 705 (Jon Hanson ed., 2012); John G. Gunnell, Politkal Sciere on tiu Curp: Recovering a
Disceipne' Past, 99 AM. PoL. SC. REV. 597 (2005); Jonathan Cohn, Irrational Exuberaxe, NEW
REPUBLIC, Oct. 25, 1999, at 25; see alo EILEEN BRAMAN, LAW, POLITICS, AND PERCEPTION 1419 (2009) (describing history of political science).
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pressure them to focus either on the rule of law or the rule of politics.
On the political science side, for instance, Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J.
Spaeth maintained that Supreme Court justices vote their political preferences."' They argued that quantitative studies demonstrate not only
the power of politics over the justices but also the falsity of the "legal
model.""' They concluded that "tmditional legal factors, such as precedent, text, and intent, [have] virtually no impact" on Supreme Court decision making.'" On the law side, constitutional originalists are merely
the latest legal scholars to claim that they can purify legal interpretation
of political influence. Most originalists insist that they can discern a
fixed and objective constitutional meaning."' Randy Barnett, a leading
new originalist, explicitly argued that the "appeal of originalism rests on
the proposition that the original public meaning is an objective fact that
can be established by reference to historical materials."15 2 Politics, then,
is supposedly banished from legal interpretation (including, in particular, constitutional interpretation).
Such denials of either law or politics in adjudication are not the
only means of attempting to tame the law-politics dynamic. Another
common approach is to police the boundary between law and politics--ostensibly forcing each to remain on its respective side. Regardless, all such efforts to subdue the law-politics dynamic amount to
fighting the tofu. They are likely to be as frustrating and futile as wrestling with that squiggly white gelatinous mass. The law-politics dynamic
will not succumb no matter how much or how often scholars denyit,
police it, or otherwise try to tame it. The law-politics dynamic will remain at the core of adjudication.
From this perspective, both Barzun's Impeaching Precedentand Pos-

148 SEGAL& SPAETII, supra note

13, at xv-xviii, 65.

149 Id. at 33-53.
150 HAROLD

J.

SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL,

MAJORITY

RULE OR MINORITY WILL:
&

ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT xv (1999); See JEFFREY A. SEGAL
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REvIsrrED (2002).
Segal and Spaeth are leading attitudinalias, but rational choice political scientists also emphasize
the influence of politics on adjudication E.g., Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Mapftng Out the Strakgic Terraitr The Informaional Role of Amid Croia, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW

INSTITIONALIST APPROACHES 215, 216 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999)
(discussing rational choice or strategic approach).
151 Randy E. Barnett, The MisconceitedAssumptionAbout ConstitutionalAssumptions, 103 Nw. U.

L.REv. 615, 660 (2009); see Lawrence B. Solum, Were All OriginalistrNow, in CONsTrrtrrIoNAL
ORIGINAIJSM: A DEBATE 1, 4 (2011) (emphasizing"the fixation thesis" oforiginalism).
152 Barnett, supra note 151, at 660.
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ner and Vermeule's Inside and Outside are revealed to be attempts to fight
the tofu. Like so many legal scholars before him, Barzun wanted to
maintain the sanctity of the legal system. He would admit the occasional impurity into the system, but only if it could help neutralize worse
impurities. To a degree, Barzun followed in the "legal process" tradition, which in fact, he explicitly defended in another article.' 53 Consistent with legal process, Barzun's Impeaching Pmrcedent sought to specify
the proper contours of the adjudicative process. Thus, Barzun focused
on the inside of the process. He would allow the occasional non-legal
consideration to become a factor, but only in closely cabined and demarcated circumstances."" While Barzun's argument was complex, he
ultimately sought to police the boundary between law and politics, between the inside and outside. No less so than Posner and Vermeule,
Barzun tried to tame the law-politicsdynamic.
Posner and Vermeule's desire to police the boundary between law
and politics was conspicuous; it was the crux of their article. They
viewed the internal and external perspectives as necessarily inconsistent.
"If the internal perspective is correct," they wrote, "then the behavioral
premises of the external perspective must seem wrong or at least questionable."'" But "[i]f the external perspective is correct, then it is hard
to see how agents will act any differently from the way they do [based
on legal or internal arguments].""' Basically, then, a scholar adopting
the internal approach and exploring legal doctrine needed to stay on the

inside. A scholar adopting an external approach and exploring exogenous causes of legal and judicial behavior needed to stay on the outside.

The inside and the outside, law and politics, should not meet. Legal
scholars and political scientists, they concluded,

"to say to one another."'0

7

just

do not have much

If they try to talk across the disciplinary

boundary, they are likely to descend into incoherence.
Ironically, the conflict between Barzun's Impeaching Precedent and
Posner and Vermeule's Inside and Outide turned a spotlight on the law-

153 Barzun, Forgotten, supra note 139; se HART & SACKS, supra note 16 (articulating the legal
process approach).
154 In their classic legal process materials, Hart and Sacks explained that in common
law and
statutory interpretation cases, reasoned elaboration requires a judge, in carefully circumscribed
contexts, to apply the law "in the way which best serves the principles and policies it expresses."
HART & SACKS, supra note 16, at 165.
155 Posner & Vermeule, supranote 1, at 1789.

156 Id.
157

Id. at 1797.
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politics dynamic, despite Barzun's and Posner and Vermeule's respective efforts to tame the dynamic and fight the tofu. Scholars who fight
the tofu, as already explained, often deny a crucial aspect or element of
adjudication, either law or politics. Indeed, they often deny the lawpolitics dynamic in its entirety. But any scholar who emphasizes one
side of the law-politics dynamic and repudiates the other side will be
open to criticism. Any scholar on the other side of the fence can readily
attack. Those standing on opposite sides, whether on the inside or outside, often gaze across the boundary with hostility. Hence, political scientists Segal and Spaeth were not satisfied to provide quantitative evidence showing that political attitudes motivate Supreme Court justices.
Segal and Spaeth also sought to prove that law was irrelevant to Supreme Court adjudication. 5 Likewise, legal scholars ranging from C.C.
Langdell and his disciples, writing in the late-nineteenth century, to the
legal process scholars of the mid-twentieth century, to the constitutional originalists writing today, have sought to deny or limit the effect of
politics on judicial decision making. 59 When hostility or conflict between the inside and outside erupts, the existence of the law-politics
dynamic becomes especially prominent. It can no longer remain hidden
at the core of adjudication. Thus, when Barzun's ImpeachingPrcedentand
Posner and Vermeule's Inside and Outide were juxtaposed in a single issue of the University of Chicago Law Review, tension rose to the surface. In particular, with Barzun seeking to uphold the sanctity of the inside, of legal and judicial processes, and with Posner and Vermeule
occasionally favoring the outside, conflict became unavoidable. Instead
of subduing the law-politics dynamic, as they all desired, they underscored the futility of their endeavors. Tofu splattered all over the kitchen.
Regardless, in the future, other scholars will seek to tame the lawpolitics dynamic."' Disciplinary methods assure the perpetuation of ef-

158 SEGAL& SPAETI-, supra note 13, at 33-53.
159 E.g., C.C. LANGDEL, SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 21 (2d ed. 1880); C.C.
LANGDELI, CASES ON CONTRACTS viii-ix (2d ed. 1879) (preface to 1st ed.); see STEPHEN M.
FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL TiOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO POsrMODERNISM: AN
INTElLECTUAL VOYAGE 83-105 (2000) (discussing Langdellian legal science).
160 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCAIIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: TiHE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TExTs (2012) (arguing for textualist method of statutory interpretation); Michael D.

Gilbert,Judicia/Independwe and Social Wefare, 112 MICH. L. REv. 575 (2014) (focusing on judicial
independence and judges' nonlegalistic decisions); Rob Robinson, Execudve Branch Sodalitaon
and Defereire on the U.S. Suprme Court, 46 L. & SoC'Y REV. 889 (2012) (quantitative study empha-
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forts to focus solely on law or politics in adjudication. While such efforts will inevitably continue, they fail to confront a growing amount of
empirical evidence. As Segal and Spaeth emphasized, substantial quantitative evidence shows that political scientists can explain and predict j udicial outcomes, particularly at the Supreme Court, based on political
attitudes or preferences.' "Simply put," Segal and Spaeth wrote, "[William] Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is extremely conservative; [Thurgood] Marshall voted the way he did because he is extremely liberal"1 62 Yet, simultaneously, substantial quantitative evidence
shows that scholars can explain judicial outcomes, including at the Supreme Court, based on legal doctrines. Mark J. Richards and Herbert
M. Kritzer have conducted multiple quantitative studies concluding that
legal doctrines or, in their words, "jurisprudential regimes," influence
judicial decisions.6 In fact, a growing amount of quantitative research
suggests that both law and politics shape judicial decisions. For instance, in a book by a political scientist (Lee Epstein), an economist
(William M. Landes) and a fedeal judge (Richard A. Posner), the authors considered whether legal doctrine or political ideology shaped judicial decision making in the federal courts, including the district courts,
the courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court. Their quantitative studies
revealed that "ideology influences judicial decisions at all levels of the
federal judiciary. But the influence is not of uniform strength-we have
found, for example, that it diminishes as one moves down the judicial
hierarchy-and it does not extinguish the influence of conventional
T M In another book-length quanprinciples of judicial decision-making."'
titative study, Michael A. Bailey and Forrest Maltzman concluded that
both law and political preferences matter to Supreme Court justices,'6 5

sizing ideological forces influencing justices).
161 SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 13, at 208-60; se Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Mae Good
Citigem?An Economic Analyis of InternaliedNorms, 86 VA. L. REv. 1577, 1599 n.24, 1600 n.25
(2000) (summarizing quantitative studies supporting the attitudinal model).
162 SEGAL& SPAETH, supra note 13, at 65.
163 Herbert M. Kritzer & Mark J. Richards, Jrwisprudential Regimes and Supreme Court

Dedsiornaking:T/& Lemon Regime and Establis/bnent Gause Cases, 37 L & Soc'Y REV. 827 (2003);
Mark

J.

Richards & Herbert L. Kritzer, JuisprudendalRegmes in Supreme Court DecisionMaking, 96

Am. PoL SC. REv. 305 (2002); see Andrea McAtee & Kevin T. McGuire, lanyers, Justices, and
Issue Saiewe When and How Do LegalArgnent Affect the U.S. Supreme Court? 41 L & Soc'Y REV.
259 (2007) (study showing that attorneys' arguments influence Supreme Court justices).
164 EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 385. According to these authors, "federal judges are not just
politicians in robes, though that is part ofwhat they are"Id.
165 BAH-EY & MAITzMAN, supra note 141, at 15-16; see Michael A. Bailey
& Forrest Matzman,
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though "the influence of specific legal doctrines vanes across justices."'6 Qualitative evidence (empirical evidence that is not quantified)
also shows that both law and politics influence adjudication.'6
When abundant empirical evidence points to the causal influence
of both law and politics, denial of either one becomes questionable, to
say the least. Of course, this evidence has not stopped originalists from
declaring that originalism is "working itself pure."'" From this internal
legal perspective, "[w]ords have original meanings that are fixed no
matter what current majorities may say to the contrary."' 69 But this
declaration, suggesting that politics is irrelevant to constitutional adjudication, is no less problematic than political scientist Martin Shapiro's
assertion "Courts and judges always lie. Lying is the nature of the judicial activity."o If anything, rather than uttering such sophistries, scholars in both political science and law should devote more attention to
the law-politics dynamic itself Instead of trying to tame the dynamic,

Does Legal Docttine Mater? Unpecking Law and Polkey Pmfereres on the U.S Supeme Court, 102 AMN.
Pot. Sci. REV. 369 (2008) (reaching similar conclusions).
166 BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 141, at 143; see PAMELA CORLEY ET AL., THE PUZZLE
OF UNANIMITY (2013) (study emphasizing substantial plurality of Supreme Court decisions that

are unanimous and concluding that law constrains justices from following political ideology);
SUNSTEIN, supra note 14 (study of federal courts of appeals concluding that both politics and
law influence judges). Frank Cross has conducted numerous quantitative studies concluding
that law and politics both influence judicial decision making. Frank B. Cross, Law is Politics,in
WHAT's LAW GOT To Do WITHI IT? 92 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011); Cross & Nelson, supra note 67. For a summary of much of the empirical research pointing in the various directions,
see Friedman, supra note 19, at 274-75.
167 In a historical study of Cil War and Reconstruction adjudication, Mark Graber concluded that judicial decision making "is a practice that mixes legal, strategic, and attitudinal considerations in ways that cannot be fully isolated by scientific investigation" Mark Graber, Lega4
Strategi or Legal Strategy Deciding to Decid During the Civil lar and Reconstrion, in THE SUPREME
COURT AND AmRICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 33, 35 (Ronald Kahn & Ken 1. Kersch eds.,
2006); see LEE EPSTEIN & ANDREW D. MARTIN, AN INTRODUCTION To EMPIRICAL LEGAL

3-4 (2014) (explaining difference between quantitative and qualitative evidence);
Feldman, Alcdemy, supra note 6, at 64-67 (explaining quantitative and qualitative evidence and
discussing forms of qualitative evidence suggesting that law and politics both mattet.
168 Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interprtive Folre of the Consitution's Sect
Drafting Histoy, 91 GEo. L.J. 1113, 1114 (2003).
169 Stephen G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Tno Cheersfor Profissor Balkin's Ornalism, 103 Nw. U.
L. REV. 663, 701 (2009).
17o Martin Shapiro, Judgs as Idars, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. Pot'Y 155, 156 (1994). In a related
vein, Gordon Silverstein worries that politics functions best when law does not constrain its operation. Law can narrow and harden political debate and even can "undermine or kill" politics
GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAW's AllURE: How LAW SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES, AND Kiu s
Potrrics 3-4 (2009).
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explore how it works. In other words, stop fighting the tofu.
A distinction between politics writ small and politics writ large can
help elucidate the law-politics dynamic. If a judge (or justice) disregards
the law and decides a case in order to achieve a political goal qua political goal, then that judge has engaged in politics writ large. The judge
acts like a legislator, consciously and purposefully following his or her
political preferences or allegiances. For example, many commentators
have argued that the conservative justices decided Bush v. Gore because
theywanted George W. Bush rather than Al Gore to be the next president.1'7 The justices invoked the Equal Protection Clause, but its application was unique and inconsistent with prior Equal Protection Clause
cases.17 2 Such instances of politics writ large are rare. Judicial decision
making in accord with politics writ small, however, is common. When a
judge sincerely interprets the relevant legal texts and decides a case (or
votes to decide a case) accordingly-with the judge's horizon, including
political ideology, naturally shaping the judge's interpretation and decision-then the judge has decided pursuant to politics writ small.173 Politics writ small, that is, inheres in legal interpretation. Or to put it conversely, legal interpretation is politics writ small. The concept of politics
writ small accentuates that a judge (or justice) always interprets legal
texts from within his or her horizon, which encompasses political pref-174
erences or allegiances.
A crucial point emerges from the distinction between politics writ
large and writ small Precisely because politics writ small is integral to
legal interpretation, judges' (or justices') sincere interpretations of legal
texts typically coincide with their political goals and allegiances. In most
cases, especially at the Supreme Court level, justices do not experience a
conflict between their sincere interpretations of the relevant texts and
doctrines and their political preferences or allegiances. A justice rarely
171 Bush v. Gore,

531 U.S. 98 (2000);

HOWARD GiLuMAN, THE VOTES THAT COUNTED:

HOW THE COURT DECIDED THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 2-5, 185-89 (2001); Cass R.

Sunstein, Or&r Without Law, 68 U. Ci. L. REv. 757,759(2001).
172 531 U.S. at 104-10, GILLMAN, supra note 171, at 141-43.
173 See Feldman, A/hewmy, supra note 6, at 82-83 (distinguishing politics writ large from politics
writ small; TAMANAJIA, supra note 132, at 187-89 (distinguishing cognitive framing from willful

judging).
174 See Feldman, Ak/xm, supra note 6, at 82-83. Suppose one imagines a situation where a
judge has a hunch about the proper result in a case and then searches the legal materials for
precedential and doctrinal support. Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjicaion: A

CritialPhenomenologp, 36 J. LEGAL EDuc. 518 (1986). In my terminology, both the judge's hunch
and the judge's interpretation of the legal materials would entail politics writ small.
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considers a case and reasons as follows: 'The best interpretation of the
relevant texts and doctrines necessitates conclusion X, but my political
preference is conclusion Y. What should I do?' Instead, the justice likely reasons as follows: 'The best interpretation of the relevant texts and
doctrines necessitates conclusion Z (and fortuitously, conclusion Z coincides with my political preference).' Of course, such correspondence
between law and politics is not truly fortuitous; it is built into the interpretive process. Moreover, this correspondence between law and politics in interpretation and adjudication accords with the empirical evidence. If, as discussed, ample quantitative evidence suggests that both
law and politics influence judicial decision making, then maybe it is
true: Both law and politics influence judicial decision making.7 1
While a few Supreme Court decisions, such as Bush v. Gore, seem
to illustrate politics writ large, far more cases manifest politics writ
small. In fact, numerous constitutional law cases are fascinating because
of the law-politics dynamic. A constitutional law professor could study
or teach Marbut v. Madision by focusing on the legal doctrine of judicial
review and John Marshall's textual arguments for judicial review.1'7 Or a
political scientist could study or teach Marbuy by emphasizing the political conflict that had developed during the 1790s between the Federalists, led by Alexander Hamilton and John Adams, and the Republicans,
led by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. " From this perspective,
Marbut pitted a Federalist Chief Justice, Marshall, against the Republican President, Jefferson, and Secretary of State, Madison. But either of
these approaches to teaching Marbutwould miss a large part of the story- namely, the law-politics dynamic. Marshall interpreted the constitutional text, particularly Article III on judicial power, but he did not discover some fixed and objective meaning. The text did not explicitly
grant the Court the power of judicial review over either the executive
branch or Congress."' Yet, Marshall's reading of the Constitution was
reasonable and in accord with a developing contemporary understanding of the judicial role in American government. 7 Simultaneously,
175 E.g., BAILEY&MALTZMAN, suPra note 141, at 143; EPsTEIN, Srpra note 14, at 385.

176 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
177 On politics in the 1790s, see STANLEY EucrNs & ERIC McKITRICK, THE AGE OF
FEDERALISM (1993); JAMES ROGER SHARP, AMERICAN POIUTICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC (1993).
178 U.S. CONST., art m, § 2.
179 On the developing concept of judicial review, see SYLVIA SNOWIss, JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUrION (1990); William Michael Treanor, Judical Remiew Bfor
Marbut, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455 (2005); Gordon S. Wood, The Origins offudkialReiew Revidited or
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Marshall's conclusions, that the Court had the power of judicial review
over the executive branch and Congress, corresponded with his Federalist political orientation. Even so, he walked a legal tightrope over a political minefield of Republican opposition. While reasonably interpreting
the constitutional text to reach doctrinal conclusions consistent with his
political ideology, he ultimately gave Jefferson and Madison the result
they wanted. He held that the Court lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested relief to a Federalist appointee, WilliamMarbury, who hoped to
secure a position as a justice of the peace in Washington, D.C."
One more example should suffice. A rich law-politics dynamic imbued United Statesv. Lope7, the landmark commerce power case.'"' LopeZ
held that Congress had exceeded its commerce power when it enacted
the Gun-Free School Zones Act (GFSZA), a generally applicable law
proscribing the possession of firearms at school. A scholar (or teacher)
could describe Lope as a bald political decision When the Court decided this case, in 1995, political conservatives were in the midst of an attack against so-called big government. They constantly criticized Congress, in particular, for its attempts at liberal social engineering. 8 2 They
traced expansive congressional power to the New Deal and denounced
the Court's 1937 acceptance of such power.8 3 One can, therefore, readily analyze Lope. from this political perspective. The five conservative
justices-Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, O'Connor, and Rehnquist, who
wrote the majority opinion-outvoted the four liberal justicesStevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg- and, therefore, reached the
conservative conclusion. They invalidated liberal legislation, constrained
congressional power, and in so doing, chipped away at big government.1M

How the Marshal CourtMad More Out oflers, 56 WASIl. & LEE L. REv. 787 (1999).
180 See G. EDWARD WIIITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815-1835

(1991) (discussing Marshall Court); James M. O'Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REV. 219 (1992)
(discussing Marshall Court and Marbury, in particular); William W. Van Alstyne, A CritialGuid
to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1 (same).
181 U.S. v. Lopez, 514 US. 549 (1995).
182 See, e.g., NATHAN GIAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION (1978) (critiazing affirmative
action programs).

183 W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); see Lope, 514 U.S. at 599 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that the
Court took a "wrong turn" in 1937); Richard A. Epstein, The Mistakes of 1937, 11 GEO. MASON
U. L. REV. 5, 20 (1988-1989) (arguing that Court should reverse "the mistakes ofl 937").
184 See, e.g., SEGAi, supra note 14, at 70 n.67 (citing lpeZ as example of conservative
Rehnquist Court decision).
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But this political analysis does not explain the landmark status of
LopeZ which revolves around legal doctrine. Rehnquist's majority opinion began by presenting the Commerce Clause text and asserting that
the Court would apply it in accord with a rational basis test, the doctrine the Court had consistently applied in commerce power cases since
1937.185 Unlike in many of those prior post-1937 cases, however,
Rehnquist did not apply the rational basis test as a mechanism of judicial deference to congressional judgment and the democratic process.""
With only two exceptions-and the Court had quickly overruled one of
the two-the post-1937 Court had upheld every congressional action
taken pursuant to the commerce power.' 87 If the people did not like
congressional action, the Court had consistently reasoned, then the
people could vote for new legislators." But in Lope, Rehnquist reformulated the rational basis test rather than deferring to Congress and the
democratic process.189 In so doing, Rehnquist added formalist distinctions that resonated with pre-1937 Supreme Court commerce power
decisions- distinctions that the post-1937 Court had repudiated.'" For
instance, Rehnquist relied on an ostensible dichotomy separating economic from non-economic activities; he reasoned that gun possession
at schools (the subject matter of the GFSZA) is a non-economic enterprise unrelated to commerce.' 9 To Rehnquist, 'economic' and 'noneconomic' were a priori categories, and gun possession could readily be
placed in one (non-economic) rather than the other (economic).
Breyer's (liberal) dissent argued contrariwise, emphasizing that, from a
practical standpoint, educational activities closely intertwine with economic (commercial) development. "Schools that teach reading, writing,
mathematics, and related basic skills serve both social and commercial

Lope, 514 U.S. at 552-53, 557.
See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120-29 (1942) (upholding an application of Agricultural Adjustment Act of1938).
187 In the two previous cases invalidating congressional commerce actions, the Court focused primarily on the Tenth Amendment. N.Y. v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Nat'l League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
188 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-56 (1985).
189 According to the reformulated rational basis test, Congress could regulate the channels of
interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and activities substantially
affecting interstate commerce. Lope7, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
190 Id. at 559-68; see d. at 627-28 (Breyer, J, dissenting) (criticizing Rehnquist's formalism).
191 Id. at 561.
185
186
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purposes, and one cannot easily separate the one from the other."1 92
Disregarding this criticism, Rehnquist used similar pre-1937 formalism
when he reasoned that gun possession at schools is a local rather than a
national matter and thus falls outside Congress's commerce power. His
distinction between "what is truly national and what is truly local" 93
even echoed language from the Court's 1918 decision in Hammer v.
Dagenhart, which held that Congress had exceeded its commerce power
by regulating child labor.1 94 Indeed, Rehnquist cited numerous pre-and
post- 1937 commerce power decisions to support his reformulation of
the rational basis test into a type of formalist doctrine."
The most interesting aspect of LpeZ was neither the doctrine,
standing alone, nor the political orientation, standing alone. Rather, it
was the law-politics dynamic-the interrelationship of the law and the
politics. Rehnquist and the other conservative justices started with a rational basis doctrine that had exemplified judicial restraint and deference to democracy and manifested libera political acceptance of government. They transformed it into a doctrine implementing aggressive
judicial oversight of and limitations on congressional power and embodying politically conservative distrust of government. Rehnquist's
choice of relevant precedents-both pre- and post-1937-manifested
the justices' concern for the legal doctrine, including the precise reformulation of the rational basis test as encompassing formalist distinctions."' Moreover, the law-politics dynamic underscores that LopeZ had
potentially significant legal and political consequences for the future. In
particular, the LopeZ reformulated rational basis doctrine has guided
192 Id. at 629 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
193 Id. at 567-68.
194 The Hammer Court distinguished "a purely federal matter" from "a matter purely local in

its character." Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 274, 276 (1918).
19s E.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Houston, E. & W. T. R. Co. v.
U.S., 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
'6
The 1-0e. Court's emphasis on the lack of congressional findings also reintroduced a
doctrinal mechanism that had facilitated the judicial imposition of substantive limitations on

congressional power during the pre-1937 era. See A. Christopher Bryant & TimothyJ. Simeone,
Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court's New "On the Recon" Constitudonal Review of FederalStat-

utes, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 328, 356 (2001) (describing "rigorous review of the legislative record"
as characteristic of pre-1937 Supreme Court decision making). For instance, in Hill v. Wallare,
decided in 1922, the Court invalidated a statute as beyond the commerce power partly because
Congress had failed to find that the evidence showed the regulated activities burdened interstate

commerce. 259 U.S. 44, 68-69 (1922); cf, Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 31-38 (1923)
(upholding statute similar to the one invalidated in Hill partly because Congress made sufficient

findings).
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courts in subsequent cases to invalidate congressional actions.1' To be
sure, the doctrine does not render these conservative conclusions inevitable, but they became more likely after than before Lopej.8
These examples, Marbury and Loper, suggest that scholars (and
teachers) should devote less energy to policing the law-politics boundary and more to exploring the law-politics dynamic. Boundary policing
and other attempts to tame the law-politics dynamic are doomed to futility and can push scholars in untoward directions. For instance, Barzun's ultimate goal of protecting the sanctity of law, the purity of the
inside, cannot succeed. Lw, in some pristine sense, cannot be shielded
from politics or other improper considerations because legal interpretation and judicial decision making always embody the law-politics dynamic and entail politics writ small Meanwhile, when Posner and
Vermeule concluded that legal scholars and political scientists have little
to say to one another,199 they got it exactly backwards. Academic and
professional disciplinary methods might create high walls between law
and politics, between the inside and outside, but those disciplinaty
methods do not change the nature of adjudication. Adjudication encompasses a law-politics dynamic that scholars should excavate and analyze. We should draw on the methods of law, when useful, the methods of political science, when useful, and any other disciplinary (or
interdisciplinary) methods that can help elucidate the law-politics dy*200
namic.

197 E.g., U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating Violence Against Women Act as
beyond congressional power); Fla ex ret Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dept of Health and Human Servs.,
648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (invalidating individual mandatein Affordable Care Act).
198 Cf, Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (invalidating individual
mandate in Affordable Care Act as beyond Congress's commerce power but upholding it pursuant to Congress's taxing power); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding federal law
proscribing the possession of marijuana). The Rehnquist Court invalidated more congressional
acts than had any previous Court. TotMAs M. KBCK, THE MoST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN
HISTORY 2 (2004); DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER 31 (8th ed. 2008); Barry Friedman, The
Cydes of ConsitutionalTheoy, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149,161 (2004).
199 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1797.
200 One could reasonably argue that Posner and Vermeule's recommendation to separate law
and politics is in tension with Vermeule's own theory of constitutional systems. In The System of
the Consitution, Vermeule emphasized that a system "can have emergent properties that cannot
be deduced by inspecting their components or members in isolation, one by one." VERMEULE,
supra note 59, at 8. Although Vermeule did not identify law and politics as components of the
American constitutional system, his theory would seem to fit adjudication. In other words, in a
sense, law and politics go into the judicial decision making process, but they together create
something distinct from the separate components. One drawback to conceptualizing adjudica-
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Indeed, Posner and Vermeule derived their conception of political
science from the mainstream of the discipline-scholars like Segal and
Spaeth who emphasize the self-interested pursuit of political goals-but
some political scientists are themselves concerned with the interrelationship of law and politics. This cadre of political scientists have
adopted a label to identify their alternative approach to research: American Political Development (APD). 20' APD focuses on the developmental histories of political institutions and how those institutions respond
to subsequent political changes 1 For instance, does a particular institution, such as the Supreme Court, accommodate or resist particular
political changes?2 3 In an APD book focused on Supreme Court adjudication, Ronald Kahn and Ken I. Kersch conceptualized the ostensible
law- politics dichotomy in adjudication "as a debate over the respective
influences of internal and external factors . . ., with law being an important potential internal influence, . . . and electoral politics being a

significant potential [external] influence." From their perspective, adjudication engenders an "interplay of the internal and external" that
produces a degree of judicial independence, "a certain autonomy from
ordinary politics at certain times." That is, courts are unique government institutions precisely because of the law-politicsdynamic.2 05

tion in this manner is that it suggests that law and politics can be isolated in the judicial process.
I am arguing, though, that the law-politics dynamic cannot be broken into pure law and pure
politics.
201 KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT (2004). Barzun, in his Rerponse, has a footnote citing to APD scholarship. Re-

sponse, supma note 8, at 277 n.33.
202 ORREN & SKOWRONEK, supra note 201, at6.
203 See, e.g., HOWARD GII.MAN, THIE CONsrrLtrriON BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERSJURISPRUDENCE (1993) (discussing how the Lochner Court continued to apply legal doctrine despite significant political changes).
204 Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch, Introdwtion, in THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN
PoLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 1, 18 (2006).
205 APD scholars view law as a component of the judicial institution that contributes to the
formation of judges' attitudes and political preferences. Cornell Clayton & Howard Gillman,
Introduction, in THIE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POITICS: NEW INSTITITIONAUST
INTERPRETATIONS 1, 2 (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds., 1999); Terri Peretti, Conrtrating the State Action Dxtrimr, 1940-1990, 35 L & SOC. INQUIRY 273, 290 (2010). In other words,
APD scholars reject the notion that judges' political preferences are independent of courts as
institutions. Because of this emphasis on the operation of institutions, some APD scholars are
referred to as historical (or new) institutionalists. Graber, supra note 67, at 317.
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CONCLUSION

Law and politics are inextricably bound together in legal interpretation and adjudication. The law-politics dynamic is inescapable, untamable. Nevertheless, disciplinary methods will drive legal scholars and political scientists to attempt to subdue the dynamic in various ways, such
as denying the dynamic and policing the ostensible law-politics boundary. But scholars, including law professors and political scientists, should
resist these disciplinary urges. We have only begun to tap our understanding of the law-politics dynamic and should encourage research in
this direction.
I do not deny the possibility of studying law or politics without attending to the other. Political scientists, studying adjudication, can continue to focus solely on politics. Likewise, law professors can continue
to focus on legal texts and doctrines. Such isolationist studies can provide useful information about adjudication, but neither approach can
describe the entirety of the adjudicative process. I should emphasize,
then, that this Essay concerns both adjudication and scholarship about
adjudication. I recommend a particular direction for scholars-namely,
giving sustained attention to the law-politics dynamic-which contravenes Posner and Vermeule's suggestion that the disciplines of law and
political science have little to share with each other. But my recommendation about scholarship stems from my analysis of adjudication- emphasizing the law-politics dynamic at the core of legal interpretationwhichundermines Barzun's desire to preserve the sanctity of law.20

-

206 While my argument leads to recommended changes in legal scholarship, it does not necessarily suggest changes in legal and judicial practices. In other words, an awareness of the law
politics dynamic and politics writ small does not necessitate any change in adjudication. Feldman, Alchwy, supra note 6, at 93-95. Law professors, political scientists, and historians have observed that adjudication, especially constitutional adjudication, entails a subtle negotiation over
the separation of law and politics. These scholars have emphasized that, in Marbury and other
cases, Chief Justice Marshall helped catve from the political realm an area of potential controversy, largely related to property and wealth JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE LIMITS oF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 189-93 (1990); O'Fallon, supra note 180, at 221;
Wood, Supra note 179, at 803-05. By suggesting that property and wealth were matters of law,
Marshall placed them within the control of (Federalist) federal judges rather than democratic
majorities. My argument, revolving around the law- politics dynamic, might initially appear inconsistent with this observation-that cases often entail negotiating over law and politics. But
in truth, my argument not only is consistent with but illuminates it. The key is to distinguish
between politics writ small and writ large. Insofar as scholars point to constitutional cases as
involving negotiation over the separation of law and politics, the scholars implicitly refer to politics writ large (as politics rather than law). If property rights are placed within the legal realm,
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My criticisms of Barzun's Impeaching Pecedent and Posner and
Vermeule's Inside or Outride do not completely repudiate their arguments. I agree with Barzun when he argues that the nature of legitimate
legal argument is not static. It is open to contestation. Plus, I sympathize with Posner and Vermeule's call for consistency in scholarship if
it is diluted into a call for clarity. In light of the law-politics dynamic
that is at the heart of adjudication, scholars shouldnot be limited to following only a legal or only a political science approach When scholars
switch their analytical standpoints, though, they should clarify their respective disciplinary perspectives, whether the discipline is law, political
science, or some interdisciplinary combination. And given the limits of
our current methodological tools in law and political science, scholars
seeking to penetrate and explore the law-politics dynamic should be
open to and experiment with interdisciplinary methods.

then legislators supposedly should not engage in a politics writ large that would directly change
the nature of those property rights. Changes to property rights would trigger legal issues resolvable in the courts. But these legal issues-the legal realm negotiated in opposition to the political realm-are not matters of pristine law. They are not purified of all politics. To the contrary,
whenever courts adjudicate issues within this legal realm, the courts are engaged in politics writ
small. In other words, when scholars argue that cases negotiate a separation between law and
politics, the scholars are too vague. To be precise, these cases negotiate a separation between
the law-politics dynamic (the legal realm), on the one side, and politics writ large (the political
realm), on the other side. Politics-or, at least, politics writ small-is never erased from the
legal realm.

